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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  provides  conceptual  foundations  for  analyzing  organizations  comprising 
multiple legally autonomous entities, which we call meta-organizations. We assess the 
antecedents of the emergence of such collectives and the design choices they entail. The 
paper identifies key parameters on which such meta-organizations’ designs differ from 
each other.  It  also  presents  a taxonomy that elucidates  how such forms  of collective 
action vary and the constraints they must address to be successful. We conclude with 









     3 
INTRODUCTION 
The world of organizations has evolved substantially since the foundational theories of 
organizational design were first postulated. We have undoubtedly learned much from the 
array  of  theories  developed  to  address  the  emergence  of  increasingly  complex 
organizational forms over the course of the twentieth century. Each era’s theories in part 
reflected the managerial preoccupations of the times and coevolved with them, beginning 
with the work of Barnard (1938) and Coase (1937), who documented the rationale for 
and  management  systems  underlying  increasingly  large  integrated  organizations.  The 
work of Simon and his colleagues at Carnegie Mellon (Simon, 1947; March and Simon, 
1958; Simon, Thompson and Smithburg, 1950) opportunely addressed the increase in 
informational complexity and foreshadowed the growing sophistication of information 
technologies within organizations. Later the work of Thompson (1967), Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) documented that the patterns of division of labor and integration of effort 
within firms were associated with the environmental context in which they are located.  
 
The domain of organizational design arrived at an empirical hiatus after the 1970s as 
much theoretical and empirical attention shifted to outside the firm (e.g. ecological and 
institutional  pressures,  inter-firm  relationships).  The  topic  of  organizational  design 
receded from attention as a productive line of inquiry for organizational scholars just as 
the managerial challenges of organization design were becoming more complex (though 
see exceptions like Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989;  Milgrom and Roberts, 1995; Nadler and 
Tushman, 1988). More recently, we have since seen an increase in interest in the topic of 
organizational design triggered by a range of design challenges such as agility (Doz and   4 
Kosonen, 2008), resilience (Gulati, 2010), customer-centricity (Galbraith, 2001), social 
responsiveness  (Kanter,  2009),  balancing  innovation  and  efficiency  (Tushman  and 
O’Reilly,  1997;  Brown  and  Eisenhardt,  1997;  Gulati  and  Puranam,  2009),  and 
environmental sensitivity (Henderson and Newell, 2011).   
 
In the same spirit, we point to an increasingly important phenomenon that begs careful 
theoretical  consideration  by  organization  design  scholars.  This  phenomenon  has  two 
manifestations, the first of which has been in plain sight for a while. Since the 1980s we 
have  witnessed  a  dramatic  increase  in  the  frequency  with  which  firms  enter  into 
collaborative relationships; such partnerships typically span geographies, industries, and 
value chains (e.g. Reuer, 2004; Gulati, 1995, 1998, 2007). This signals a trend toward 
greater specialization as firms increasingly rely on partners to execute work central to 
their success, often despite significant transaction costs. Similarly, the rise of strategic 
outsourcing more broadly (Gulati and Kletter, 2004) and business-process outsourcing 
more particularly (Srikanth and Puranam, 2010) is another indicator of the strength of this 
phenomenon.  
  
Building  on  earlier  work  on  external  communities  (eg  Von  Hipple,  1988),  a  second 
component has become visible as the internet and related technologies have become tools 
of both knowledge production and dissemination; this has hastened the recognition that 
actors outside the traditional boundaries of the firm possess unique knowledge that may 
be applicable within the firm (von Hippel, 1988, 2005; Benkler, 2006; Vanhaverbeke, 
2006; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010; Chesbrough, 2003).  Task modularization and the   5 
involvement  of  a  wide  distribution  of  actors  with  unique  knowledge  are  helping  to 
displace  the  locus  of  work  that  was  formerly  considered  core  to  the  firm  (such  as 
innovation) to outside its boundaries (Baldwin and Von Hippel, 2011). Such strategic 
contingencies  as  knowledge  distribution,  the  decomposability  of  tasks,  the  intrinsic 
motivation that tasks generate, and the ease of re-aggregation of tasks all appear to be 
novel antecedents of firms’ boundary choices (see also Grandori, 2001; Nickerson and 
Zenger, 2004; O’Mahony and Lakhani, 2011; and Lakhani, Lifshitz, and Tushman, in 
press).  
 
A few examples of this tendency for firms to “shrink their core” while “expanding their 
periphery” (Gulati and Kletter, 2004) may be useful to highlight the underlying unity of 
these phenomena: Consider Apple, which has reduced its own direct internal inputs into 
some of its devices, while launching an immensely successful Apps Store, virtually none 
of whose products it produces but 30 percent of whose revenues it captures. Apple has 
also moved the kernel of its core operating system to an open community even as it 
partners with Intel for aspects of its hardware (see Lakhani, Lifshitz, and Tushman, in 
press). Apple is not an isolated instance. Industries like pharmaceuticals, once tightly 
vertically integrated, have witnessed the outsourcing of key tasks ranging from R & D to 
clinical trials and manufacturing (Azoulay, 2004). Nor is the phenomenon restricted to 
high  technology  industries  or  indeed  the  for  profit  sector.  Organizations  that  have 
embraced this externalization of key tasks range from behemoths like Proctor & Gamble, 
which  dramatically  reorganized  its  research  activities  with  its  “connect-and-develop”   6 
initiative (Huston and Sakkab, 2006), to public-sector organizations like NASA (Lakhani, 
Lifshitz, and Tushman, in press).   
 
Yet, while the world of practice has been changing dramatically in a direction that places 
ever greater importance on coordination beyond the boundaries of the firm (Gulati and 
Singh,  1998;  Gulati,  Lawrence,  and  Puranam,  2005;  Reuer,  2004),  our  theories  of 
organization design, with their strong intra-firm bias, continue to emphasize elements like 
formal authority (embodied in contractually specified employer-employee relationships), 
the design of incentives like salary, bonuses, benefits, and promotion opportunities, and 
the collocation of individuals performing highly interdependent activities. These elements 
are inconspicuous, if not entirely absent, in clusters of firms and open communities that 
work effectively as single organizations.  
 
We argue that the increase in close collaboration between formally independent firms and 
in  open  communities  of  legally  autonomous  actors  poses  challenges  for  our  thinking 
about  organizational  design.  In  brief,  if  prominent  forms  of  economic  organization 
increasingly involve multiple firms as well as communities of non-contractually linked 
individuals, an emphasis on intra-firm design may be out of date, or at the very least 
incomplete. Due to the open and peer nature of these communities, the traditional design 
logics of control,  hierarchy,  formal roles, and  pecuniary  incentives  have less traction 
(Lakhani, Lifshitz, and Tushman, in press).  
   7 
WHAT IS A META-ORGANIZATION? 
To facilitate the necessary conceptual transition  we introduce the concept  of a meta-
organization,  defined  as  an  organization  whose  agents  are  themselves  legally 
autonomous and not linked through employment relationships. An agent in this definition 
could  itself  be  an  organization  (within  which  there  may  well  be  employment 
relationships), but which can be treated as a unitary actor for purposes of analysis. Thus, 
meta organizations comprise networks of firms or individuals not bound by authority 
based on employment relationships but characterized by a system-level goal. As in a 
traditional organization, the existence of a system  level  goal  does  not  imply that the 
constituent agents share it; profit maximization may be the goal of the business firm but 
not necessarily of all its employees. Thus, even in a meta-organization, each agent has its 
own motivations, incentives, and cognitions, but unlike in a traditional business firm, 
they are not linked via a framework of formal authority associated with employment 
contracts.  
 
Meta-organizations  resemble  biological  super-organisms,  a  multitude  of  individual 
organisms that coexist, collaborate, and co-evolve via a complex set of symbiotic and 
reciprocal  relationships  which  together form  a larger organism  (Tautz and Heilmann, 
2008). However, in contrast to purely self-organized systems, in a meta-organization, this 
system-level  goal  corresponds  to  the  goals  of  its  architects.  For  instance,  when  one 
examines the meta-organizations surrounding P&G, Toyota, Apple, or the founders of 
Wikipedia,  there  is  little  doubt  whose  goals  shape  those  of  their  respective  meta-
organizations -indeed, that is how these meta-organizations are informally identified (also   8 
see  West  and  Lakhani,  2008),  on  the  role  of  leading  firms  and  individuals  in  meta-
organizations  like  the  Linux  kernel  community).  Meta-organizations  represent  a 
particular  kind  of  technology  of  organizing—specifically,  how  to  organize  relations 
among  legally  autonomous  entities,  whether  firms  in  a  network  or  individuals  in  a 
community, without recourse to authority inherent in employment contracts (though other 
forms of contract may well play a role). 
 
  The defining feature of a meta-organization is the absence of formal authority arising 
from  an  employment  relationship  in  the  relationships  between  constituent  entities. 
Authority is legitimate power to dictate actions, and authority created via the employment 
relationship  has  long  been  recognized  as  a  defining  feature  of  traditional  business 
organization (Weber, 1922; Coase, 1937; Simon, 1951). Authority that emerges through 
the employment relationship plays a key part in shaping an organization’s design, which 
arises from fundamental choices about the division of labor and about the grouping and 
linking structures that promote integration of effort (Simon, 1951; Simon, Thompson and 
Smithburg,  1950).  In  meta-organizations,  formal  authority  as  embodied  in  an 
employment  relationship  may  exist  within  the  boundaries  of  individual  constituent 
organizations but it does not extend to the ties that connect them.  
 
Neither business groups nor multi-national firms are meta-organizations because 
central actors exercise formal authority over constituent firms through their controlling 
ownership  stakes  (Khanna  and  Palepu,  2000).  Similarly,  the  web  of  exchange 
surrounding any economic actor does not correspond to a meta-organization (since both   9 
an  architect  and  a  system  level  goal  are  missing).  Dyadic  relationships  such  as 
outsourcing  relationships  and  strategic  alliances  also  do  not  necessarily  feature  the 
network of entities we see as characterizing a meta-organization.  
 
Yet, central actors actively shape the design of meta-organizations. Consider Toyota or Li 
&  Fung  (the  Hong  Kong-based  consumer-goods  multinational)  in  their  supply 
networks (in most of which they have no ownership stakes), or Apple in its ecology, or, 
indeed, Linus Torvalds in the Linux open-source community. What are the substitutes for 
formal authority that these actors wield to influence the design of meta-organizations? 
 
First,  even  if  the  architects  of  meta-organizations  lack  formal  authority  based  on  an 
employment contract, they may possess significant informal authority based on expertise, 
reputation, status, gatekeeping privileges (whereby they regulate who gets in), or control 
over key resources or technology (Blau, 1964). Status and informal authority in open-
source projects, for example, are rooted in perceived technical competence and associated 
contributions  (Raymond,  1999;  Lee  and  Cole,  2003;  Lakhani  and  von  Hippel,  2003; 
Dahlander and O’Mahony, 2011).  
 
Second,  bargaining  power  arising  from  asymmetric  dependence  promotes  outcomes 
similar to those that formal authority enables (Gulati and Sytch, 2007). For example, Li 
& Fung or Toyota can ask for and obtain adherence to its policies from suppliers almost 
as a corporate HQ in a multi-business firm can (Dyer, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 1998; Dyer   10 
and Nobeoka, 2000; Gulati and Sytch, 2007). Indeed by maintaining both internal and 
external suppliers, firms are able to enhance their bargaining power with both (Puranam, 
Gulati, and Bhattacharya, forthcoming). The basis of this ability is not formal authority 
rooted in the employment relationship, but the bargaining power these firms command 
over  members  of  their  meta-organization.  This  bargaining  power  stems  from  the 
possession of unique resources (such as brands, reputation, or access to customers) or 
investments  in  knowledge  advantages.  For  example,  Intel  invests  in  R&D  in  many 
components of the PC ecosystem that it does not itself produce (Ethiraj and Puranam, 
2004).  
 
Two  additional  features  besides  the  absence  of  formal  authority,  though  not  strictly 
unique to meta-organizations, also bear mentioning. First is the importance of forms of 
compensation  other  than  (immediate)  pecuniary  incentives.  The  networks  that  supply 
Toyota  or  Li  &  Fung  doubtless  feature  cash  compensation,  but  the  non-contractible 
shadows of the future and of the past—the expectation of future gains from exchange, 
and the ability to trust and coordinate with a partner based on past experiences—may be 
at least equally important in these relationships (Gulati, 1995; Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000; 
Gulati and Nickerson, 2008; Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, 2002; 
Puranam and Vanneste, 2009; Vanneste and Puranam, 2010). Meta-organizations like 
Wikipedia  or  the  Linux  development  community  eschew  monetary  compensation 
altogether. Some individuals are paid by their employers to participate but those firms are 
essentially donating those resources to the community (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). Instead, 
in the majority of cases, they may use needs, reputations, intrinsic motivation, and kudos   11 
are  the  (non-contractible)  benefits  that  motivate  contribution  and  exchange  in  such 
communities (e.g., von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; O’Mahony, 2003; Lee and Cole, 
2003: Shah, 2006). These communities have had a dramatic impact on problem-solving 
outcomes (see Kogut and Metiu, 2001; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003); they are self-
motivated,  self-selected,  and  self-governed  (von  Krogh,  Spaeth,  and  Lakhani.,  2003; 
Boudreau, Lacetera, and Lakhani, 2011; Dahlander and Gann, 2010). In such contexts, 
self-selection drives both participation and effort (von Krogh et al., 2003; Boudreau and 
Lakhani, 2011).  
 
Meta-organizations also often employ substitutes for collocated communication. While 
few large firms enjoy the luxury of collocation of all their employees, it is important to 
note that such organizations can bring at least some of their members together for high-
bandwidth, rich-media face-to-face interactions. Decisions about who is collocated with 
whom  are  as  important  as  decisions  about  who  is  grouped  with  whom  in  the 
organization’s divisional structure (Nadler and Tushman, 1997). In meta-organizations, 
by contrast, any significant degree of collocation is impractical. Use of information and 
telecommunication technologies (ICTs) and partitioning of tasks in a manner that allows 
independence  of  action  are  alternatives  to  collocated  production  within  meta-
organizations  (MacCormack,  Rusnak  and  Baldwin,  forthcoming;  Hinds  and  Kiesler, 
2002; Srikanth and Puranam, 2010).  
 
THE RISE OF META-ORGANIZATIONS: ANTECEDENTS    12 
Since  Coase’s  original  analysis  (1937),  we  have  known  that  even  when 
production costs are lower outside a firm, the additional transaction costs associated with 
externalizing  work  tend  to  create  an  impetus  towards  integration  within  the  firm. 
Subsequent work has refined our understanding of the nature of these transaction costs, 
and the extent to which they can be ascribed to opportunism or problems of coordination 
(Kogut  and  Zander,  1996;  Gulati  and  Singh,  1998;  Gulati,  Lawrence,  and  Puranam, 
2005). Research on the core competences of corporations (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Barney, 1991; Leiblien, 2003) has offered a complementary perspective, suggesting that 
firms locate the activities that drive their competitive advantage within own boundaries 
and  outsource  the  rest.  Finally,  a  significant  body  of  research  in  organization  theory 
studies how the firm’s boundaries may protect the firm from dependencies in its task 
environment by erecting them around critical task, power, and competence contingencies 
(e.g., Thompson, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979; Santos and Eisenhardt, 
2005).  
 
Despite these benefits of internalizing activities, a number of factors have collectively 
fueled  recent  trends  toward  the  externalization  of  work  and  the  emergence  of  meta-
organizations. 
1 The growing capacity for  geographic dispersion of work  facilitated by 
communication  and  information  technologies   is  an  important  determinant  of  meta-
organizations  (Hinds and Kiesler, 2002).  Labor market cost differential arbitrage and 
                                                        
1 These are in addition to the traditional supply-side factors such as basic 
economies of scale and scope, and the “economies of focus” that enable the existence of a 
deep market of external suppliers who can operate faster, cheaper, and better than the 
internal units of a diversified organization (Gulati and Kletter, 2005; Jacobides and 
Winter, 2005).   13 
differential access to skilled labor have also been critical in shaping this shift. Catalyzed 
by  falling  communication  costs,  many  organizations  have  developed  sophisticated 
practices that enable the division of labor and reintegration of efforts across geographies 
in ways that were inconceivable a few decades ago (Srikanth and Puranam, 2010).  Task 
disaggregation in the context of low-cost communication has spurred the emergence of 
communities  and  competitive  tournaments  (in  which  many  contributors  compete  to 
provide the best contribution) that are sometimes as effective as firms at innovation and 
knowledge  production  (O’Mahony  &  Lakhani,  2011).    Thus,  previously  firm-based 
innovation  activities  may  now  be  performed  in  external  market,  community,  or 
tournament settings (Boudreau and Lakhani, 2009).  
 
More  generally,  in  a  rapidly  changing  and  increasingly  competitive  environment, 
customers  in  most  sectors  have  more  information  and  more  choices;  this  increases 
pressure on firms to be agile and responsive to shifting customer needs (Gulati, 2007, 
2010). Firms have also had to learn to operate and sell their products and services in 
disparate markets around the globe and at very different price points (Kumar, 2004). This 
set of circumstances has led firms to conclude that the costs of internal bureaucracy often 
exceed external transaction costs. Under these conditions, firms seek out external partners 
who are quicker and more responsive than their own internal business units. 
 
Meta-organizations emerge when focal firms attempt to exercise control over external 
partners  despite  the  absence  of  formal  authority  within  an  employment  relationship. 
Meta-organizations prevail today in many sectors and take a wide variety of forms. In the   14 
automotive  industry,  meta-organizations  operate  in  the  OEM-supplier  networks 
orchestrated centrally by OEM firms. In the IT sector, platform providers like Microsoft, 
Apple, Google, SAP and Cisco cultivate thriving developer communities, which typically 
consist of thousands of globally dispersed small and large organizations, some tightly and 
some loosely tied to the platform providers and with varied in their levels of interaction 
with  each  other.  In  the  nonprofit  domain,  large  philanthropic  funds  like  the  Bill  & 
Melinda  Gates  Foundation  fund,  monitor,  and  direct  meta-organizations  of  nonprofit 
agencies,  connecting  them  with  each  other  and  with  crucial  political,  social,  and 
economic actors.  
 
DIMENSIONS OF META-ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNS 
Every meta-organization  must, by  our definition, employ some substitutes for formal 
authority, but the precise manner in which those alternatives are generated and exercised 
exhibit  systematic  variations.  We  argue  that  patterns  within  this  variation  may  be 
understood by considering two important dimensions of meta-organizations: the degree to 
which a meta-organization’s boundaries are open or closed and the degree of its internal 
stratification  (see  Table  1).  Given  the  early  stages  of  our  understanding  about  meta-
organizations, we restrict ourselves to describing variations along these dimensions; a 
full- fledged theory that may consider a whole array of other dimensions and also second 
order questions such as when we should observe which combination of variations must 
be deferred to future efforts.  
   15 
Permeability of Boundaries 
Meta-organizations  encompass  multiple  organizations  and/or  communities  of  self-
motivated individuals. Though the notion of “the boundaryless organization” (Ashkenas 
et al., 1995) emphasizes the importance of inter-organizational relationships, the inter-
organizational  collective  itself  is,  ironically,  not  without  boundaries.  Strategic 
deliberation about the extent and limits of purposive organizing is as relevant to meta-
organizations  as  it  is  to  integrated  organizational  entities:  it  shapes  the  attraction, 
selection, and retention of members of the collective. The meta-organization’s boundaries 
provide  a  basis  for  members’  identification  with  the  collective  and  the  collective’s 
differentiation from others. The essential aspects of such boundary arrangements include 
(1)  who  chooses  members  (2)  criteria  for  membership  (i.e.,  the  attributes  members 
possess and the degree of redundancy between them); and (3) duration and exclusivity of 
membership (i.e., whether members can belong to more than one meta-organization).  
 
A  fundamental  design  consideration  for  a  meta-organization  is  how  membership 
decisions are made. A decision to grant membership may be made bilaterally, between 
the  architect  and  the  new  member.  An  OEM  managing  a  network  of  partners  may 
consider the repercussions on its other relationships of establishing a relationship with a 
new supplier (Khanna, 1998), but ultimately the decision is its own to make. In other 
cases,  introducing  a  new  member  into  a  collective  requires  the  approval  of  existing 
members.  In  both  contexts,  contracts  typically  spell  out  expected  contributions  (e.g., 
minimum financial and temporal commitments), returns, and exit clauses. Membership is 
essentially closed—that is, new members require some form of approval to join.   16 
 
Alternatively,  designers  of  meta-organizations  may  choose  more  open  membership 
arrangements  in  which  the  boundaries  are  kept  more  permeable.  Membership  in  the 
collective  is  based  on  self-selection.  Many  IT-platform  providers—such  as  the  Open 
Handset Alliance, which develops the mobile-phone operating system Android—only, 
require developers to accept a terms-of-use agreement, leaving them broad latitude to 
decide what they want to contribute to the platform. Collectives that rely entirely on self-
selected membership may find it more difficult to fill competence gaps and to ensure 
coordination or task completion, since exit from the collective is as easy as entry. Open 
membership can result in unsolicited and unwanted contributions as well as contestation 
of collective goals and agreements. 
 
To retain the ability to create meta-alignment, platform operators and communities often 
reserve  the  right  to  approve  contributions  and  thus  preempt  unwanted  activity,  or  to 
reactively exclude unwanted contributions and contributors. Many open-source projects 
and “crowd-sourcing” communities, such as Wikipedia, Flickr, and YouTube, rely on 
reactive  policing  procedures  to  weed  out  unwanted  content.  Thus,  though  ex-ante 
membership criteria are open, and contributing to the collective is made easy, certain 
criteria  and  conditions  are  clarified  and  enforced  ex-post.  Approval  and  policing 
procedures in meta-organizations must necessarily be delicately managed, so as not to 
invalidate their openness  and alienate  contributors. Variations  in  how  committed and 
involved members of the meta-organization are must be taken into account. Extended   17 
waits  for  approval  of  contributions,  and  high  rates  of  rejection  or  removal  of 
contributions, will discourage members from future resource commitment. 
 
Next,  we  consider  the  question  of  membership  criteria.  Even  if  no  employment 
relationship exists between the constituent entities in a meta-organization, its architects 
are likely to exercise considerable care when choosing whom to admit: the permeability 
of the meta-organization may be kept deliberately low by means of careful specification 
of criteria. Possession  of particular technologies or  capabilities  are  frequent selection 
criteria (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008; Das and Teng, 2000), but reputational and social 
capital are also prized (Arend, 2009; Ahuja, Polidoro, and Mitchell, 2009). For example, 
an IT firm launching a new software platform may seek to include established OEMs in 
its  ecosystem  of  partners  because  they  can  lend  legitimacy  to  the  new  software  and 
provide access to a large potential customer base. Similarly, a nonprofit organization may 
seek the endorsement of a major philanthropic funder in hopes of benefiting from its ties 
to influential economic or political actors. In short, inclusion in a meta-organization may 
be based on the potential member's internal resources or on its network resources (Gulati, 
Mehrotra, and Sytch, 2008). 
 
An important resource-related strategic consideration for boundary arrangements is the 
redundancy of members’ resources and capabilities. Redundancy denotes the degree to 
which  member  organizations  possess  identical  relevant  resources  or  capabilities.  One 
way to look at redundancy is as a measure of inter-organizational slack: high redundancy 
produces  more  flexibility  to  adapt  to  changes  in  the  environment,  provides  more   18 
opportunities  for  innovation,  and  allows  for  parallel  processing  of  similar  problems. 
High-redundancy meta-organizations maintain a lower level of interdependence and  a 
lower risk of disrupting effective operation of the collective in case of fluctuations in 
membership.    However,  redundancy  may  also  impact  relational  and  power  dynamics 
within the collective. High redundancy also conceivably gives the architects of the meta-
organization greater bargaining power. High redundancy also carries certain costs, as it 
may  reduce  openness  and  cooperation,  if  members  with  redundant  resources  and 
capabilities  struggle  to  differentiate  their  contributions  to  the  collective,  or  consider 
themselves more easily replaceable; they may thus be hesitant to pursue activities they 
perceive as helping others but not improving their own position in the collective. Low-
redundancy  meta-organizations  create  a  system  of  strong  interdependencies  between 
members, and support a high degree of co-specialization. 
 
Finally, the architects of a meta-organization may also use boundary arrangements to 
shape  the  nature  of  the  relationship  between  its  constituent  entities,  in  particular  the 
exclusivity and duration of membership. Exclusivity of membership  characterizes the 
degree to which member organizations make specific contributions exclusively to a focal 
meta-organization and not to others. In some meta-organizations, such as airline alliance 
networks for instance, membership is exclusive; membership in one meta-organization 
precludes  membership  in  another.  In  contrast,  membership  in  Li  &  Fung’s  meta-
organization  is  not  exclusive.  Especially  in  highly  competitive  market  environments, 
exclusive contributions from members may be vital to strategically differentiate the meta-
organization’s  products  and  services.  This  restrictive  approach  to  managing  the   19 
boundaries  of  the  meta-organization  can  be  particularly  useful  when  the  meta-
organization  is  competing  with  other  (meta-)  organizations,  or  when  the  meta-
organization generates resources vulnerable to free riding.    
 
Duration of membership designates the length of time an organization remains a member 
of the collective (Van De Vrande, Lemmens, and Vanhaverbeke, 2006). Some partnering 
contracts  specify  a  minimum  period  of  engagement  in  the  meta-organization.  Others 
implement strong disincentives to discourage members from leaving the collective before 
certain collective goals are achieved or individual contributions are made in full. Explicit 
barriers to  premature exit  can aid  in screening applicant  organizations; they can also 
promote  attainment  of  strategic  objectives  that  require  longer  sustained  effort  from 
members to yield a return (Gulati et al., 2008). 
 
In  sum,  decisions  about  boundaries  and  the  relative  openness  of  membership 
fundamentally alter the behavioral dynamics within a meta-organization, as well as the 
range  of  feasible  governance  arrangements.  Closed  membership  is  reminiscent  of 
traditional inter-organizational forms like strategic alliances. Partner search, screening, 
and selection are crucial tasks in these cases, and the timing of a new member’s entry is 
controlled.  Closed  boundaries  typically  go  hand  in  hand  with  an  explicit  and,  more 
importantly, a tailored definition of tasks and of relationships to other members. Each 
member’s  specific  role  in  the meta-organization is  negotiated  from the start, and the 
duration of membership and timing of exit is also negotiated. Closed membership is also   20 
associated with fewer members and active management of members’ diversity, in order 
to facilitate inter-organizational coordination.  
 
Open  membership,  on  the  other  hand,  makes  the  timing  of  members’  entry  and  exit 
difficult to control, and constrains designers to provide standardized role conceptions to 
new members. Opening up membership creates significantly higher collaboration-process 
losses, which may be offset by increasing input (such as number of members and number 
of contributions) and by encouraging collective attempts at improving the process.  
 
Degree of Stratification  
Many meta-organizations exhibit significant stratification; a hierarchical differentiation 
of roles or tiers of membership is marked in some cases and none in others. For instance, 
Boudreau  and  Lakhani  (2009)  describe  higher  stratification  in  meta-organizations 
associated  with  integrator  platforms,  where  a  single  actor  aggregates  the  innovative 
efforts of multiple actors, than in those associated with two-sided platforms in which the 
key actor merely brings together customers and suppliers. Where stratification is present, 
the upper tiers enjoy more extensive decision-making rights, bear more responsibility for 
coordinating the activities of the lower tiers, and participate in the meta-organization’s 
design  decisions.  Tiering  has  two  important  functions  for  the  collective:  it  reduces 
coordinative  complexity  and  serves  as  a  motivational  mechanism.  (For  example,  see 
Fjeldstad et al., this issue, on how IBM uses tiering in its meta-organization.)  
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Stratification helps reduce the complexity of coordination by subdividing the collective 
into  smaller  subgroups  (Simon,  1962;  Zhou,  forthcoming).  Assigning  higher-tier 
organizations  to  supervise  and  coordinate  the  activities  of  specific  sets  of  lower-tier 
organizations in turn enables the highest-tier organizations to concentrate on oversight of 
the overall meta-organization. Like hierarchies in traditional organizations, tiering serves 
to specify spans of control within meta-organizations. In OEM-supplier networks, for 
example,  the  top-tier  suppliers  are  responsible  for  planning,  scheduling,  and  quality 
control  of  the  activities  of  lower-tier  suppliers,  and  in  some  cases  for  selection  and 
strategic  development  of  those  suppliers.  In  this  instance,  tiering  exploits  the  innate 
hierarchy of tasks associated with the value chain (Simon, 1962).   
 
Alternatively,  tiering  may  be  based  not  on  assigned  tasks  but  on  an  administrative 
hierarchy, within which the tiers differ less in the sequential ordering of tasks than in 
terms  of  who  exercises  authority  over  whom.  In  retail  supply  chains,  for  instance, 
retailers designate certain vendors as “category captains”. These vendors are responsible 
for  improving  shelf  arrangements,  launching  product  introductions,  and  planning 
promotional initiatives, in conjunction with other vendors and their own suppliers, to 
increase the retailer’s sales and profitability in a particular category (Subramanian et al., 
2010). As many open-source communities demonstrate, however, tiers do not always go 
hand in hand with a concrete mandate or domain of oversight. Instead, higher-tier status 
may  entail  only  an  unspecific  expectation  of  greater  involvement  in  community-
management  tasks  and  resolution  of  community  issues;  (see  O’Mahony  and  Ferraro, 
2007).   22 
 
Stratification  and  tiering  can  also  serve  as  a  motivational  device.  The  material  and 
symbolic  benefits  associated  with  higher  tiers  can  create  incentives  for  member 
organizations to contribute to the collective, and can even establish a “career trajectory” 
for them. The responsibilities awarded to higher-tier organizations also draw attention to 
which issues are important and which competencies are valued in the community, and 
thus help channel members' activities—without the direct intervention of higher tiers—
toward desired ends. For example, assigning the upper tiers to stimulate innovation and 
improve efficiency within the collective signals to the lower tiers that successful self-
initiated efforts in those directions may qualify them for higher-tier status in the future.   
Wikipedia, for instance, has a publicly declared egalitarian ethos, and many functions 
traditionally reserved to formal authority—such as resolution of disputes and exceptions 
are instead put to a vote. Yet it is widely known that all votes are not equal, as frequent 
contributors are seen as experts with greater credibility and legitimacy (Gorbatai, 2011).    
 
A high degree of stratification gives rise to, and enables the exercise of, status- or role-
based authority structures. Though such authority may be limited in scope, especially in 
open-membership  contexts,  it  still  creates  a  social  structure  that  can  guide  task 
identification and assignment, decision making, and conflict resolution.  In contrast, a 
low degree of stratification is likely to support the emergence of a “community of equals” 
in  which  members  are  simultaneously  principals  and  agents  of  the  collective.  Such 
communities are also more likely to adopt peer-based approaches to coordination. Some 
designers may deliberately minimize stratification within meta-organizations to avoid, for   23 
example,  debates  about  the  criteria  and  processes  for  determining  status,  and  to 
encourage broad participation in vital design/supervisory tasks.  
 
Flatter,  more  egalitarian  designs  are  associated  with  heterarchical  coordination 
arrangements,  whereby  all  members  have  similar  or  overlapping  rights  and 
responsibilities  to  promote  alignment  of  activities  within  the  collective—which  often 
involves extensive multilateral negotiation and consensus-building efforts. Alternatively, 
supervisory tasks may be temporarily assigned to particular members, depending on their 
capabilities and the specific tasks in question. Such low-stratification contexts enhance 
the member’s sense of ownership of and commitment to the meta-organization. They 
may, however, also discourage co-specialization and make it more difficult and time-
consuming to arrive at community-level decisions and resolve conflicts. 
 
In sum, decisions about internal stratification have significant impacts on both motivation 
and coordination within meta-organizations. While a high degree of stratification may 
replicate many of the conventional benefits of stratification within traditional (business) 
organizations,  it  also  potentially  replicates  its  costs.  Where  widespread  participation 
based on a sense of involvement and identification with the meta-organization (fueled by 
a sense of egalitarianism and freedom from the explicit exercise of authority) is critical, 
lower degrees of stratification may be preferable. 
 
A TAXONOMY OF META-ORGANIZATIONS   24 
Using stratification and membership boundaries as the two dimensions of a matrix, we 
have differentiated four types of meta-organizations (see Table 1).  
Insert Table 1 here 
Those  with  significant  stratification  and  closed  membership  most  closely  resemble 
traditional extended-enterprise models (Aron and Singh, 2005), in which a focal firm (or 
group of firms) contracts with upstream, downstream, or horizontal partners that possess 
complementary  assets  to  enhance  its  own  capacities,  market  reach,  technology, 
capabilities,  or  reputation.      McDonald’s  franchising  system  is  an  example,  as  are 
Toyota’s  and  Li  &  Fung’s  tightly  managed  supplier  networks.  In  such  meta-
organizations, informal authority based on bargaining power is carefully nurtured and 
exercised via choices about boundary permeability and stratification. Linkages between 
members of the meta-organization are directed rather than emergent.  
  
There is evidence, however, that the Toyota supplier network is moving toward a closed-
community  model  in  which  decision  making  and  responsibilities  are  more  evenly 
distributed (though there will continue to be lead actors, notably Toyota itself) and action 
is  multilateral  rather  than  unilateral  (Evans  and  Wolf,  2005).  Toyota  (and  other  car 
manufacturers)  expect  suppliers  to  be  more  than  order-takers—that  is,  to  participate 
proactively in strategically directing the meta-organization and to invest in its future. 
Other  examples  of  the  closed-community  type  of  meta-organization  are  industry 
consortia  and  standards  committees  that  seek  to  build  member  consensus  around 
technical or governance standards and/or regulatory initiatives (e.g., Rosenkopf, Metiu, 
and George 2001).    25 
 
Open-membership  meta-organizations  with  low  stratification  resemble  open 
communities or public forums more than they do traditional organizations. Given their 
flexible boundaries, their structural features—such as processes, groups, and factions or 
clusters of members—are constantly in flux.  Authority is less well defined, and linkages 
are  emergent  rather  than  directed  (O’Mahony  and  Ferraro,  2007).  Order  is  typically 
created by means of simple agreed-upon ground rules and/or mutual ad-hoc policing of 
member activity. Open communities are self-organizing contexts in which actors share 
knowledge freely (Baldwin and von Hippel, 2011; Franke and Shah, 2003; Faraj and 
Johnson, 2011).   
 
The open-source software (OSS) movement, for example, has generated an alternative 
ecosystem in which external-to-the-firm user communities design, develop, distribute, 
and  support  complex  products,  whether  on  their  own  or  in  alliance  with  other  firms 
(Lakhani  and  von  Hippel,  2003;  von  Hippel,  2005;  Boudreau  &  Lakhani,  2009; 
O’Mahony and Lakhani, 2011; Lerner and Schankerman, 2010). OSS communities are 
open in the sense that their outputs can be used by anyone (within the limits of the 
license), and that anyone can join merely by subscribing to an e-mail list. Openness in 
terms of membership leads in turn to transparency in the development process, since 
communication  about  projects  and  their  direction  largely  occurs  in  public.  Project 
leadership is thus accountable to the wider community for its growth and future direction, 
and everyone is aware of shortfalls and issues. Transparency also affords individuals self-  26 
determination with respect to the level of effort they choose to expend and awareness of 
others’ efforts that they might be able to fold into their own.  
 
The  online  open-source  encyclopedia  Wikipedia  was  initially  constructed  on  such  an 
open  and  low-stratification  model:  much  of  the  encyclopedia  was  written,  edited, 
formatted,  and  organized  by  any  member  of  the  community.  Over  time,  however, 
Wikipedia has differentiated roles and editing rights in the community, and has slowly 
moved toward a managed-ecosystem model; the large majority of members contributes 
to the system’s input—the variation, phrased in ecological terms—and a smaller group of 
editors is responsible for most of the pruning and policing—or, again in ecological terms, 
the selection and retention processes (Gorbatai, 2011). A number of for-profit firms have 
sought to adopt a similar managed-ecosystem approach. The Open Handset Alliance, led 
by Google, has released its Android mobile operating-system platform under an open-
source  license  (Linux).  Google  provides  developer  tools  (and  some  support)  free  of 
charge,  enabling  numerous  developers  to  create  complementary  software  for  the 
platform.  These  tools  also  assist  hardware  developers  in  offering  a  wide  variety  of 
Android-based devices to consumers. However, new platform releases and updates are 
controlled by Google, and technological trajectories for new features are primarily agreed 
upon by a core group of major carriers, manufacturers, and Google. Thus the community 
is characterized by a clear differentiation of roles and power (also see Fjeldstad et al. this 
issue on IBM’s meta-organization).  
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The  business  model  of  InnoCentive  is  another  example  of  a  managed-ecosystem. 
Partnering with its clients’ R&D laboratories, InnoCentive broadcasts their clients’ most 
difficult-to-solve,  in-house  science  problems  (such  information  is  traditionally  highly 
proprietary).  InnoCentive works  with  firms  to generalize their problems  such that no 
company-specific  information  is  revealed.  Solutions  received  are  then  evaluated  by 
InnoCentive’s client. A firm that is offered a suitable solution to its broadcast problem 
acquires the IP from the solver in exchange for the agreed-upon prize. Most IP transfer 
clauses grant the seeker rights to internal use and the solver rights to use in applications 
not required by the seeker (Lakhani and Panetta, 2007). 
 
It is important to note that any given focal firm may simultaneously employ several types 
of  meta-organization  design  across  the  different  meta-organizations  they  create.  At 
NASA,  for  example,  space  operations  embody  an  extended-enterprise  meta-
organizational  design,  but  space-medicine  operations  are  organized  as  a  managed 
ecosystem.  Similarly,  Lego  organizes  its  traditional  building-blocks  business  as  an 
extended-enterprise design, but its robotics product lines represent both open and closed 
communities (see Lakhani, Lifshitz, and Tushman, in press). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In an analysis of novelty in forms of organizing, Puranam, Alexy, and Reitzig (2011) 
argue  that  a  new  form  is  one  that  embodies  new  solutions  to  the  basic  problems  of 
organizing—the  division  of  labor  and  the  integration  of  effort—in  contrast  to  the   28 
solutions  used  by  existing  organizations  with  similar  goals.  Meta-organizations  thus 
represent  a  class  of  novel  forms  of  organization:  they  solve  the  basic  problems  of 
organizing without explicitly relying on formal authority as enshrined in an employment 
contract.  We have outlined some ways  in  which meta-organizations  achieve this,  but 
much remains to be learned. For instance, a very fundamental set of questions pertains to 
when (i.e. under what conditions) we should expect to observe meta-organizations of a 
particular kind of permeability and stratification to emerge. While we have outlined some 
of the benefits and costs of both permeability and stratification in meta-organization, a 
careful mapping of these to particular contexts remains an important research endeavor. 
Or stepping back further, we could ask when and where we are would expect to see meta-
organizations  in  the first  place and  further if the founding  conditions  imprint certain 
logics that stay with those organizations long after.   
 
Another set of questions worthy of further exploration is how the designers of meta-
organizations specify a division of labor— that is, how they divide up and allocate tasks.  
The key decisions are the locus of task definition and assignment, the level of specificity 
and standardization of tasks, and the degree of task redundancy, as well as the process 
whereby  tasks  are  allocated  to  actors  within  the  meta-organization.  For  instance, 
designers may assign specific task packages to particular members, or let members self-
select  or  self-design  tasks  aligned  with  overarching  objectives,  or  reactively 
distribute/assign “leftover” tasks. For example, administrators in open-source software 
development monitor which code modules show signs of redundant efforts and which 
exhibit inadequate efforts.    29 
 
A  meta-organization’s  designer  must  recognize  and  accommodate  members' 
organization-level  strategies  (and  affiliations  with  different  meta-organizations),  and 
provide them a guiding economic logic for collective action while allowing appropriate 
flexibility for this logic to be realized. Tasks and objectives in some meta-organizations 
may be relatively broad and highly abstract, resembling ideological foundations rather 
than concrete milestones and action steps.  As a result, we expect task definition and 
assignment  often  to  resemble  an  ecology  with  some  induced  and  some  emergent 
processes and dynamically changing rules for selection and retention of key initiatives 
(Burgelman, 1991).   
 
Another key question worthy of investigation is: does authority derived from bargaining 
power  lead  to  fundamentally  different  patterns  of  division  of  labor  within  meta-
organizations than authority arising from expertise or charisma?  In supplier networks 
like Toyota’s or Li & Fung’s, for instance, the division of tasks basically reflects the 
value chain of the industry, whereas allocations of tasks are carefully orchestrated by the 
architect of the meta-organization. In Open Source Software development projects, by 
contrast, tasks may be divided up with a high degree of   granularity and diversity, but 
contributors  self-select  into  tasks  (MacCormack,  Rusnak  and  Baldwin,  forthcoming). 
Thus an important question is whether particular forms of non-contractual authority are 
associated with particular forms of division of labor. 
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A third set of issues that bear investigation are how the nature of authority in meta-
organizations may also influence the choice of mechanisms for integrating efforts. Once 
membership in the collective is established, designers must consider the linkages that are 
to be created among members, notably communication and decision-making channels 
(Gulati and Singh, 1998). Such channels determine information flow across boundaries 
and lend a certain degree of transparency to particular members' activities and decisions, 
thus  creating a  basis for coordination (Gulati  and Sytch, 2007). By determining who 
collaborates  with  whom,  and  thus  promoting  interaction  among  particular  clusters  of 
members,  linkages  also  shape  knowledge  sharing  and  inter-organizational  learning. 
Important  design  considerations  for  linkages  include:  (1)  which  linkages  are  to  be 
encouraged, (2) how deep/strong relations between organizations should be, and (3) how 
specific ties can be incentivized. 
 
Consider  the  two  ends  of  the  continuum  of  choices  about  linkages.  At  one  end,  the 
system  could  be  configured  to  allow  the  topology  (who  is  connected  to  whom)  and 
content  (the  type  of  relationship)  of  linkages  between  members  to  emerge  without 
substantial  authoritative  interference.  A  host  of  relational  mechanisms—such  as 
homophily,  proximity,  clustering,  and  isomorphism—may  operate  in  these  contexts. 
However, given that the configuration of linkages (and thus of access to information and 
participation in decision making) significantly impacts the distribution of power in the 
collective, at the other extreme designers may want to control the linkages. For example, 
they may want to increase the density of ties in the network of member organizations to 
avoid  bottlenecks  and  to  reduce  the  influence  of  relatively  more  centrally  positioned   31 
organizations  (Iansiti  and  Levien, 2004). Sometimes  designers also  try  to  change the 
nature of linkages. Toyota, for example, is well-known for encouraging its suppliers to 
exchange not only subassemblies and production plans but also knowledge about process 
improvements and systems optimization (Dyer and Nobeoka, 2000). Such openness and 
mutual support requires a high level of cooperation among members.  
 
Another important question about the internal organization of meta-organizations pertains 
is  how  particular  linkages  can  be  incentivized.  Privileged  access  to  information  or 
involvement in important decisions may serve as an intrinsic motivator for high-priority 
relations in the collective. Standard-setting committees are an example: the prospect of 
influencing crucial decisions can drive participation. In many cases, however, the extra 
effort required to engage in particular kinds of relations with other organizations calls for 
material or symbolic compensation. In some cases the (implied) threat of sanctions is 
used  to  mandate  the  sharing  of  information  even  as  the  rewards  of  doing  so  are 
emphasized. In Li & Fung’s network, for instance, constituent organizations understand 
that they must share their best practices; if they do not give, they do not receive, and the 
benefits of receiving are clear.  
 
Finally, it will be valuable to learn about other sources of authority in meta-organizations 
besides bargaining power, expertise, and reputation. For instance, Puranam et al. (2011) 
point out that certain exclusive founders’ rights are embedded in the project-management 
software in use on open-source collaborative platforms like Source Forge. Specifically, 
founders have the authority to assign certain types of project work, or to delegate this   32 
power to other members of the meta-organization. By pinpointing other forms of non-
contractually-specified authority, we may be able to  extend our understanding of the 
nuances  of  Weber’s  tripartite  conceptualization  of  authority  as  rational-legal, 
competence-based,  or  charismatic,  and  of  how  these  types  of  authority  manifest 
themselves in meta-organizations.   
 
We conclude by noting that it is not our claim that what we call meta-organizations have 
so far escaped the attention of academics; closely related, if not identical arrangements 
have  been  variously  characterized  as  “virtual-organizations,”  “ego-networks,” 
“constellations,”  “ecologies,”  “industrial  clusters,”  “ecosystems,”  and  “hybrid 
organizations”  (e.g.  Williamson,  1991;  Moore,  1996;  Mowshowitz,  2002;  Murmann, 
2003; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007; O’Mahony and Bechky, 2008). But scholarly work 
on the various forms of multi-actor assemblages is largely disconnected from each other 
and shows few signs of convergence. Above and beyond our integrative objective of 
conceptualizing all of these types of collectives as meta-organizations, what is unique 
about our approach is that it explicitly treats a cluster of legally autonomous entities 
(firms  or  individuals)  as  an  organization,  and  acknowledges  that  such  a  meta-
organization,  like  any  organization,  embodies  key  structural  elements  that  can  be 
designed.  
 
Rather than assuming that meta-organizations are entirely self-organized (because formal 
authority is invisible), we examine how architects of meta-organizations come to shape 
these systems in which their own activities are embedded. We also develop a taxonomy   33 
of  meta-organizations  that  articulates  important  differences  between  these  emerging 
forms based on their degree of stratification and the permeability of their boundaries.  
 
Our analysis provides an analytic framework for conceptually bringing together a wide 
variety  of  inter-organizational  and  community  forms  under  one  category  (meta-
organization),  but  at  the  same  time  establishing  dimensions  along  which  systematic 
variations within this category may be studied (stratification and boundary permeability). 
It also highlights differences between perspectives on traditional organizational design 
and  meta-organizational  design.  We  thus  offer  conceptual  foundations  which  other 
scholars can refine, extend and use. We believe our approach promises to address the 
often-voiced concern that inter-organizational scholarship, and in particular studies of 
strategic alliances and networks, has not fully grasped the diversity of the clusters that 
have emerged, nor developed an understanding of the design parameters that help to 
partition the rich and diverse space of such forms of organizing (e.g., Benkler, 2006; 
Faraj and Johnson, 2011).  
 
We have presented an initial effort to understand the vast range of meta-organizations 
that we observe today. Many areas of inquiry about meta-organizations remain fertile 
ground for further investigation. We hope that this paper, as well as the other papers in 
this special issue, serve as an impetus for future research on the topics of strategy and the 
design of organizational architectures. 
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